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The Criminalized State:
The International Criminal Court, the Responsibility to Protect,
and Darfur, Republic of Sudan
MATIHEW H. CHARITY *

ABSTRACT

The international community continues to struggle with the question of
what to do when a nation fails to protect its own people from systemic
neglect, mistreatment, or even genocide. For many years, this debate pitted
proponents of humanitarian intervention by a third-party against those who
believe that all others must defer to the sovereign right of the state to control
its own affairs and the affairs of its people. In the midst of this debate, the
international community has adopted a middle road: insisting that states
must acknowledge their responsibility to protect their populations and if the
state manifestly fails to protect its population, empowering the United
Nations Security Council to act for the United Nations and intervene.
This "Responsibility to Protect," recognized and adopted in the U.N.
2005 World Summit Outcome and reaffirmed by the Security Council in
2006, faces its most serious test when the Security Council has recognized
that a state has failed to protect its population from crimes against humanity
but has also resisted Security Council steps of intervention. Where the
authorities have thus failed, individual government agents have opened
themselves to criminal liability for a failure to protect over and above any
direct liability for involvement in crimes against humanity. This article
argues that this additional liability creates a necessary incentive for
cooperation with the international community to prevent further harms and
has the potential to positively change the discourse on intervention,
sovereignty, and protection of persons.

* Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College Law School. J.D. Columbia Law
School, 1999. A.B. Princeton University, 1996. I wish to thank Meetali Jain, Roy Lee, Sudha Setty, and
Arthur Wolf, as well as the participants of the 2008 Northeast People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference, where I presented an earlier draft of this paper, for their thoughtful comments and suggestions.
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"The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury. One of the frrst duties of government is to afford
1
that protection. "
"Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war
crime, or a crime against humanity . . . IS a cnme under
internationallaw." 2
INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Security Council has referred only one case to the
International Criminal Court ("ICC") since the ICC's inception in 2002: the
humanitarian and political crisis in Darfur, Sudan. 3 The crisis in Darfur
involves the widespread and systemic murder and displacement of much of
Darfur's civilian populations, the responsibility of rebel groups and
government-allied militias for those killings, and attacks allegedly
perpetrated by the Government of Sudan. In particular, because of criminal
liability's application to natural persons, liability for acts attributable to the
Government of Sudan would apply to the government actors responsible for
those acts. 4
The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur5 presented a list of
individuals, including government actors, recommending their prosecution
I. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
2. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal and in
the Judgment of the Tribunal, Principle VII, [1950] Y.B. lnt'l L. Comm'n 377, U.N. Doc.
NCN.4/SER.N1950/Add.l., [hereinafter Nuremburg Principles]. As for preventing those acts and
complicity in them, the International Court of Justice has noted, "[O]ne of the most effective ways of
preventing criminal acts, in general, is to provide penalties for persons committing such acts, and to
impose those penalties effectively on those who commit the acts one is trying to prevent."_The Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v.
Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91 (Feb. 26) at 152.
3. S.C. Res. 1593, ~ I, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005) (referring "the situation in Darfur since I July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.").
4. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. NCONF.I83/9 (July
17, 1998), [hereinafter Rome Statute] Art. 27 ("Irrelevance of Official Capacity"), Art. 28 ("Responsibility of Commanders and Other Superiors"); see also Report of the International Law Commission on the
Work of its Fiftieth Session, [1998] Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 69, U.N. Doc. NCN.4/SER.N1998/Add.l
(Part 2), ~. 275 (noting the belief of some ILC members that "[a] State acted through its organs, consisting of natural persons. The individuals who planned and executed the heinous acts of States, including
the leaders of the States, must be held criminally responsible.").
5. Through G.A. Res. 1564,,; 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1564 (Sept. 18, 2004), the Security Council
asked the Secretary-General to "rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry in order immediately to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in
Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the
perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable".
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before the ICC for involvement in crimes against hurnanit/ and war
crimes. 7 The ICC has thus far issued warrants of arrest for or a summons to
appear to four individuals, including a militia leader, 8 a rebel leader,9 a
Government of Sudan Minister for Humanitarian Affairs, 10 and the head of
state, President Omar Al-Bashir. 11 The fate of these warrants, summons,
and possible prosecutions before the ICC will set the stage for future
international responses to humanitarian crises and the level of state
sovereignty, or the limitation on international involvement, that the
international community will respect.
In protecting the rights of those accused of international crimes,
including states accused of responsibility for such acts, the International
Court of Justice has rendered decisions limiting the reach of liability for
government actors for acts by non-governmental militias. Absent a showing
of effective control over the particular criminal acts of the militia or
individual at issue, a government might evade responsibility even where it
arms, trains, and otherwise provides for the ongoing actions of the militia.
Considering the general disparity in authority and control between a state
and the victim of an international crime in which the state is alleged to have
engaged in widespread and systemic crimes against its own population, such
a stringent standard will far too often expand state impunity rather than
engage state responsibility for crimes undertaken with the state's tacit
approval. Where interventions have occurred with, at the least, arguable
lawfulness, these interventions have recognized either the failure of the
authority of the state or the failure in what might be a presumption of the
state's responsiveness to its own population. What the international
community has recently formulated as a State and International
Responsibility to Protect might also be considered within the realm of just
war thinking with the additional benefit of engaging state responsibility
without resorting to war or regime change. It is essential to consider the
6. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, at Art. 7; Neuremburg Principles, supra note 2, '1!97, Principle VI (c).
7. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, at Art. 8; Nuremberg Principles, Principle VI (b).
8. Warrant of Arrest for Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman ("Ali Kushayb"), ICC-02/0501/07-3, (Apr. 27, 2007) available at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279860.PDF. (last visited
Sep. 29, 2010).
9. Summons to Appear for Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09, (May 7, 2009) available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc689342.pdf. (last visited Sep. 29, 201 0).
10. Warrant of Arrest for Ahmad Muhammad Harun ("Ahmad Harun"), ICC-02/05-01/07-2Corr., (Apr. 27, 2007) available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279814.pdf. (last visited Sep.
29, 2010).
II. See, e.g., Trial Chamber's Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest
Against Omar Hassan Ahmad AI Bashir, No. ICC-02/05-01/09, ( March 4, 2009) available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf. (last visited Sep. 29, 201 0).

70

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

context of the formulation of Responsibility to Protect, its likely pitfalls, and
its potential utility as a negotiating tool toward the cessation of widespread
harm to civilian populations and an international or universal interest in
peace and security.
Part I of this Article offers background on the humanitarian and
political crisis in Darfur, Sudan in August 2006, the point at which the
Government of Sudan refused a Security Council resolution that would have
engaged international peacekeeping/enforcing troops in the prevention of
attacks on civilian populations after the Security Council had determined
that the Government of Sudan had failed to disarm the militias. This creates
a factual framework for discussion of an international response toward
prevention of crimes against humanity, including crimes of persecution and
extermination which the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
noted "may be no less serious and heinous than genocide." 12 •
Part II examines current discord in findings of state responsibility for
acts undertaken by state-funded, armed, or trained militias prior to the
application of the Responsibility to Protect resolution. In reviewing the
standards applied to state responsibility for militias, the International Court
of Justice ("ICJ") reveals a strain in international law in the expectations of
a remedy against the state for support of militias allied to the state
apparatus.
Part II also contextualizes the international response in
recognizing that the international community must give pause in assuming
the effect of a finding of genocide. Interpreting the facts under ICJ
jurisprudence gives reason to question the potential impact of allegations of
responsibility for crimes attributable to the Government of Sudan. 13
12. Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on
Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-Genera/ Pursuant to S.C. Res. 1564, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1564
(Sept. 18, 2004), (Geneva 2005) (hereinafteriCID Report), , 522 (emphasis in original).
13. Importantly, the Bosnia v. Serbia case sets a standard in trials between States where Statesponsored genocide is alleged. The ICJ decision, therefore, does not speak to individual criminal liability, but does suggest that government actors might make further arguments limiting liability for acts or
omissions for which the state is not entirely responsible. As with other interpretations of State responsibility that States may put into practice, the actions taken by States may reflect their interpretation of what
the law is or how the States would hope the law might be applied in their cases. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 102 (1987), Reporter's Note 2; Myres
McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 356,
357-58 (1955) ("development of customary international law has been described as part of a 'process of
continuous interaction, of continuous demand and response,' among decision makers of different states.
These 'create expectations that effective power will be restrained and exercised in certain uniformities of
pattern . . . The reciprocal tolerances . . . create the expectations of patterns and uniformity in decision, of practice in accord with rule, commonly regarded as law."') A narrow interpretation of a rule
expands the practices States may engage in without derogating from that rule. That narrow interpretation is therefore more problematic where the rule so interpreted does not allow a right of derogation. See
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966), 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), Art.
4(2), precluding derogation from articles against arbitrary deprivation of life, genocide, torture, and
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Analysis would differ depending on whether the Government of Sudan: (1)
orchestrated attacks on civilian populations; (2) negligently permitted
former soldiers or allies to have the appearance of state authority through
old uniforms or arms not collected after service to the government had been
completed; or (3) recklessly armed and unleashed those likely to attack
civilian populations not favored by the Government. Responsibility for lack
of control would likely require an analysis of intent and acts by the
Government that would reasonably lead to the outcome of harm to the
civilian population.
A second-but arguably more important--question is the extent of
Sudan's responsibility for its failure to act once the international community
alerted the Government to its inability or unwillingness to prevent largescale killings and displacement of populations. This is particularly the case
when the government has access to international peacekeeping/enforcing
troops 14 but forbids entry for some time to those troops while crimes against
humanity continue with the appearance of impunity. 15 When the proposed
support in preventing crimes comes from outside the state, does the
government's purported control or lack of control over the perpetrators of
crimes matter?
Part III considers the effect of the Responsibility to Protect Resolution
on the liability of state authorities, analyzing how criminal liability under
the Responsibility to Protect ought to be viewed in terms of customary
international law. Although an open question exists regarding the extent of
control and dependence required for a fmding of control over militia groups,
over the past several years the international community has communicated
support for a finding of responsibility for governments that fail to protect
their populations. 16 The Responsibility to Protect resolution, as recognized
in the 2005 World Summit Outcome by the General Assembly of the United
17
Nations and reiterated by the Security Council in an April 2006
slavery, among other things, even in time of emergency; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 702 "Customary International Law of Human Rights,"
recognizing that "[a] state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones" genocide, slavery, murder or disappearance, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention,
systematic racial discrimination, or "a consistent pattern of gross violations of [other] internationally
recognized human rights."
14. S.C. Res. 1706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006).
15. See U.N. Sec. Council, Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution
1591 (2005) Concerning the Sudan Prepared in Accordance with Paragraph 2 of Resolution 1665
(2006), U.N. Doc. S/20061795 (2006) [hereinafter Panel of Experts Report] ("the proposed United N alions deployment has been categorically rejected by President Omar al-Bashir.").
16. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, m!l38-39, U.N. Doc. NRES/60/1, (Oct. 24,
2005).
17. 1d.
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resolution, 18 represents customary international law 19 reqmnng states to
support international efforts, through the Security Council, to prevent
crimes against humanity, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes. 20 By
preventing the Security Council from sending in peacekeepers that might
otherwise have prevented those crimes, government authorities take on
responsibility for the effects of that refusal. That responsibility merges with
the concept of criminal liability in which the government's failure allows
for foreseeable criminal action by those the government-theoreticallycontrols through its police power. 21
Finally, this article considers the potential effects-both positive and
negative-of criminal liability on the future prevention of crimes against
humanity. By recognizing a government omission earlier, the international
community has an opportunity to respond more quickly and more
effectively to the next humanitarian crisis.
PART I: DARFUR AS OF AUGUST 2006

The history of the conflict in Darfur can be discussed through various
lenses and perspectives: a central Sudan previously under British/Egyptian
control versus a western Sudan (Darfur) with a longer history of
independence; a state seeking to maintain stability leading up to elections
that could potentially grant some autonomy for oil-rich southern Sudan,
exhibiting its strength against a comparably weak Darfur; or even a state
fighting to remain a cohesive and more powerful unit where western or neocolonial interests seek to decentralize its authority following twenty years of
fighting in southern Sudan. 22 Whatever the historical roots, long turmoil in

18. S.C. Res. 1674, ~ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006), (reaffirming paragraphs 138-39
of the 2005 World Summit Outcome in the context of the protection of civilians in armed conflict (together, the "Responsibility to Protect Resolution")).
19. See Statute ofthe International Court of Justice, 3 Bevans 1179; 59 Stat. 1031; T.S. 993; 39
AJIL Supp. 215, (1945) [hereinafter JCJ Statute]. See id. at Art. 38(b) and (c) as to customs and principles oflaw, and id. at Art. 38(d) as to judicial decisions and writings as subsidiary means for determination of rules of law. This both reiterates past practices of states, and represents current practices of
states through the States' leaders expressing the States' view of applicable law.
20. Although the Responsibility to Protect Resolution, supra note 18, does not define these terms,
defmitions are found in sources such as, but not limited to: (I) Rome Statute, supra note. 4, at Arts. 6
(Genocide), 7 (Crimes Against Humanity, including Persecution and forcible transfer of a population
that might constitute ethnic cleansing), and 8 (War Crimes); (2) the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948); and (3) The International Law Commission Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1996] Y.B. Int'I L. Comm'n,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.l (Part 2), Arts. 17 (Crime of Genocide), 18 (Crimes Against
Humanity), and 20 (War Crimes).
21. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 4, at Art. 28(2).
22. See, e.g., R.S. O'Fahey, Does Darfor Have a Future in the Sudan?, 30:1 Fletcher Forum of
World Affairs 27,27-29 (2006); ICID Report, supra note 12, ~'!; 40-72. Some have also argued that the
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Sudan, combined with the potential for political instability and the growth
of differing interests in different segments of the population, paved the way
toward the current humanitarian crisis.
Although military activities of rebel groups in Darfur commenced in
late 2002 to early 2003, 23 the Government of Sudan had armed militias
years before, 24 increasing the number of weapons in the area with only
partial control over the consequences. 25 In addition to the use of the armed
forces and police in the conflict commencing in Darfur in 2003, the
Government of Sudan engaged tribal militias and individuals that might
either join Government-formed Popular Defence Forces (PDF) or fight
These militias, and sometimes the
alongside the Government. 26
paramilitary PDF and Border Security, were often collectively called
"Janjaweed."27 Reports alleged that the Janjaweed, along with the
Arab/ African divide came about during fighting in the 1980s to support policies of Arab Supremacy.
See JULIE A. FLINT, BEYOND 'JANJAWEED': UNDERSTANDING THE MILITIAS OF DARFURII-13 (2009).
23. ICID Report, supra note 12, ~~ 62-63.
24. FLINT, supra note 22, at 16; ICID Report, supra note 12, ~ 203 (reporting that the Government of Sudan Committee on Darfur suggested seven factors for the current conflict in Darfur, including
tribal competition for resources, weak local government infrastructure, a weak police presence in the
region, the interference of foreign actors in the Darfur region, and "the wide availability of weapons and
military uniforms due to other previous conflicts in the region, particularly the Libya-Chad war, and the
war in the South.").
25. See ICID Report, supra note 12, ~ 203; see also id. ~~ 67-68 (on mobilization of militias in
Darfur in 2003).
26. See, e.g., id. ~119, quoting President ai-Bashir ("Our priority from now on is to eliminate the
rebellion, and any outlaw element is our target ... We will use the army, the police, the mujahedeen, the
horsemen to get rid of the rebellion."); id. ~~ 65-68 (the Government exploited existing tensions between
different tribes, with mostly "Arab" nomadic tribes responding to the call for troops, with tribal leaders
receiving grants and gifts on the basis of recruitment efforts and PDF staff salaries sometimes being paid
through tribal leaders). See also FLINT, supra note 22, at 24 ("When Arab and Masalit village leaders
were asked to identify volunteers in West Darfur in June 2003, Arabs were accepted and armed-but
Masalit were turned away."); id. at 23 (claiming Government of Sudan manipulated Arab tribes by
saying that rebel groups, particularly of the Zaghawa tribe, had "a grand plan to push Arabs from Darfur").
27. ICID Report, supra note 12, ~~ 69, 103-110 ("victims report that the Janjaweed attackers are
from Arab tribes and, in most instances, attacked on horseback or on camels and were armed with automatic weapons of various types;" "Where victims describe their attackers as Janjaweed, these persons
might be from a tribal Arab militia, from the PDF or from some other entity;" "There are links between
all three categories [(I) tribal militias only loosely affiliated with the government; (2) paramilitary militias (the Fursan (horsemen), Mujahedeen, or "Strike Force") that fight alongside the army with a defined
command structure, but without a de jure basis under Sudanese law; and (3) PDF and Border Intelligence militias, with a legislative basis in Sudanese law.). For example, the Commission has received
independent testimony that the PDF has supplied uniforms, weapons, ammunition and payments to Arab
tribal militia from the first category. The leaders of these tribes meet regularly with the PDF Civilian
Coordinator, who takes their concerns to the Security Committee of the locality."); see also S.C. Res.
1556, 'l) 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1556 (July 30, 2004) (where the Security Council "demands that the Government of Sudan fulfil its commitments to disarm the Janjaweed militias and apprehend and bring to
justice Janjaweed leaders and their associates who have incited and carried out human rights and international humanitarian law violations and other atrocities ... [.]").
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Government of Sudan, were responsible for most of the harms to the
civilian population. 28
By August 31, 2006, international consensus recognized the crisis
situation in the Darfur region of Sudan. 29 With some estimates of hundreds
of thousands dead in the region and some two and a half million Darfuris
displaced, 30 no naturally occurring turning point that might stem the danger
to Darfur's population appeared. Militia attacks against villages including
rape, murder, and water contaminati~n continued31 while aid organizations
found roads unsafe or impassable, 32 potentially leading to tens of thousands
of more deaths from starvation, malnutrition, and unavailability of medical
treatment. 33
Although the Security Council continued to monitor on-going harrns, it
appears to have brought little strength to bear in its discussions with the
Government of Sudan. It sought a mediated or negotiated solution with the
Government to allow for the deployment of a peacekeeping force, approved
by the Security Council in August 2006, while allowing the International
Criminal Court to continue its investigation. 34 In the meantime, the
population in Darfur has continued to suffer through the effects of largescale displacements, the rape of women and girls in attacked villages and
internally displaced persons camps, and large-scale murder, much of which

28. ICID Report, supra note 12, at Executive Summary ("In particular, the Commission found
that Government forces and militias conducted indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians,
torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement, throughout Darfur. These acts were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, and therefore may amount to crimes against humanity.").
29. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1556, supra note 27 (noting that the Security Council had determined that
the situation in Sudan "constitutes a threat to international peace and security and to stability in the
region," leading to Security Council acts under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter); see also S.C. Res.
1564, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1564 (Sep. 18, 2004); S.C. Res. 1591, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1591 (Mar. 29, 2005);
S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005); S.C. Res. 1663, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1663 (Mar.
24, 2006); S.C. Res. 1665, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1665 (Mar. 29, 2006); S.C. Res. 1679, U.N. Doc.
SIRES/1679 (May 16, 2006); S.C. Res. 1706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006).
30. Lydia Polgreen, With Little Authority, African Union Force Struggles With Its Mission in
DarfUr, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 9, 2006, at AS.
31. ICID Report, supra note 12, at Executive Summary, '1! 311. Militias also maintained presences near internally displaced persons ("IDP") camps, delaying return ofiDPs to villages, and creating
a greater sense of unrest in the IDP camps. See Panel of Experts Report, supra note 15.
32. Panel of Experts Report, supra note 15, '11'1!25, 153-161 (noting attacks on and carjackings of
NGO employees); id. '1!158 (as of August 2006, "(t]he state of insecurity is increasingly hampering and
sometimes paralysing humanitarian relief programmes").
33. See Evans, DarfUr and the Responsibility to Protect, THE DIPLOMAT, Aug. I, 2004; see also
Kofi A. Annan, DarfUr Descending; No Time for Apathy on Sudan, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 25, 2006,
at A\9; World 'Not Living Up' to Its Responsibility to Protect in DarfUr, Iraq, Gaza: UN Aid Chief,
U.N.
News
Service,
Nov.
29,
2006,
available
at
http://www.un.org./apps/news/printnewsAr.asp?nid=20781.
34. See Gareth Evans, supra note 33.
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reportedly occurred with the support of the Government of Sudan. 35 The
lack of immediate international action to prevent further harms to the
population of Sudan has baffied and frustrated many 36 who thought that the
international community had agreed to act through the Security Council
under the Council's Chapter VII authority under the United Nations Charter.
An International Commission of Inquiry 37 under the auspices of the
Security Council visited Sudan/ 8 reviewed and verified governmental and
non-governmental organization reports, and interviewed politicians,
refugees and others. 39 The Commission of Inquiry determined that crimes
against humanity had occurred and continued to occur in the region. 40 The
Commission also stated that even in situations where the militias acted
without the direction of the Government of Sudan, government actors might
be liable under a theory of joint criminal enterprise by using the Janjaweed
as a "tactic of war" if the government had encouraged the Janjaweed
generally in an atmosphere of impunity and could have foreseen serious
criminal acts. 41
In 2005, the United Nations Security Council referred the situation in
Darfur to the International Criminal Court, the entity responsible for
investigating and prosecuting the international crimes of genocide,

35. Reports to the U.N. Security Council often refer to "Government forces and militias" acting
in concert, stating, for example, that the "Government of the Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible
for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under
international law." ICID Report, supra note 12, at Executive Summary.
36. See, e.g., Editorial, The Genocide Continues, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,2008, at A20.
37. See S.C. Res. 1564, supra note 29, 'II 12 (requesting "that the Secretary-General rapidly
establish an international commission of inquiry in order immediately to investigate reports of violations
of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also
whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a
view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable, calls on all parties to cooperate fully with
such a commission, and fUrther requests the Secretary-General, in conjunction with the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, to take appropriate steps to increase the number of human rights
monitors deployed to Darfur.").
38. The Commission included a former president and judge of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, a former Commissioner of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, a
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Human Rights Defenders, the Secretary-General of
the Arab Organization for Human Rights, and a former ambassador and high-court judge of Ghana.
Press Release, U.N. Headquarters, Secretary-General Establishes International Commission of Inquiry
U.N.
Doc
SG/A/890
(Oct.
8,
2004),
available
at
for
Darfur,
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2004/sga890.html. The Commission's inquiry into the
situation in Darfur focused on incidents between February 2003 and mid-January 2005, with the Commission and its investigative team visiting Sudan from November 2004 to January 2005. ICID Report,
supra note 12, at Executive Summary.
39. ICID Report, supra note 12, at Annexes 2-4.
40. /d. at Executive Summary; see also Panel of Experts Report, supra note 15, at Summary.
41. ICID Report, supra note 12, '1!126.
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aggression, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 42 The 7,000 African
Union43 peacekeepers stationed in Darfur, a r~on the size of France,
sought relief and additional international support.
On August 31, 2006, following more than three years of fighting in
Darfur, the U.N. Security Council approved a measure intended to provide
additional support to the overstretched African Union peacekeeping force,
protection to aid workers, and relief from rape, mass murder, and
dislocation to the population of Darfur. 45 When the Government of Sudan
refused to accept the U.N. peacekeepers that the Security Council voted to
send, Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that the governmental actors in
their collective and individual capacities would be responsible for any
further harm to Darfur's population. 46
As of this writing, six indictments have been issued against individuals
-one militia leader, three individuals associated with the United Resistance
Front, one high-ranking Cabinet official, and the President of Sudan. The
ICC has not yet initiated a trial and the Security Council continues to debate
whether the Responsibility to Protect reflects a lack of appropriate respect
for state sovereignty. 47 The violence in Darfur has diminished by many
accounts, but not to a point where internally displaced persons feel safe to
return to villages that have been taken by government-allied militias.
The notion of government responsibility for an omission in protecting
its populations from crimes against humanity is not entirely novel; 48 that
42. S.C. Res. I 593, supra note 29, ~ I. The preamble to the Rome Statute notes the purpose of
the ICC is to "put an end to impunity" for the perpetrators of those crimes threatening "the peace, security, and well-being of the world," in order "to contribute to the prevention of such crimes." Rome Statute,
supra note 4, Preamble.
43. See S.C. Res. 1556, supra note 27, ~ 2(endorsing "the deployment of international monitors,
including the protection force envisioned by the African Union, to the Darfur region of Sudan under the
leadership of the African Union").
44. See, e.g., Polgreen, supra note 30; Panel of Experts Report, supra note 15, 11~ 22-23.
45. S.C. Res. 1706, supra note 29, 11~ 2-12.
46. See, e.g., Sudanese May Be Held Responsible for DarfUr -Annan, SUDAN TRIB., Sep. 9,
2006 (Kofi Annan told reporters that if the Afiican Union troops withdrew and Government of Sudan
officials continued to reject U.N. troops, "they are placing themselves in a situation where the leadership
may be held collectively and individually responsible for what happens to the population in Darfur.").
47. See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar, When to Step In to Stop War Crimes Causes Fissures, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2009, at A\0 (noting the discussion of the Responsibility to Protect by Noam Chomsky
in his critique of"humanitarian imperialism").
48. See HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: INCLUDING THE LAW OF NATURE
AND OF NATIONS 386 (A. C. Campbell trans., M. Walter Dunne 1901) {1625) Grotius noted that:
kingdoms are not so much a patrimony... as a trust, placed in the hands of the sovereign for
the benefit of his people... [a] whole people may in the case of extreme necessity transfer
themselves to the dominion of another, a right which undoubtedly was reserved at the
original formation of society.
By 1991 there was recognition of a limited right to intervene for the humanitarian purpose of rescuing
individuals whose lives were endangered and where the local authorities were unwilling or unable to
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responsibility stands above and beyond any liability for direct actions,
plans, or support that may have been given to those harming its population
prior to the government's refusal to allow the entry of U.N. peacekeepers.
The ftrst issue is whether direct government accountability for the actions of
militias that may or may not serve the government or act toward
government ends is appropriate.
PART II: INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING STATE AUTHORITIES LIABILITY
FOR MILITIAS PRIOR TO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT RESOLUTION

The ICJ, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
and other entities have reviewed the standards for government or state
responsibility based in government control over militia groups in a number
of cases. The international community has made a ftrm distinction between
ftnding criminal liability against a state-which many have argued cannot
be found49-and ftnding that an individual member of a nation's
government has engaged in criminal behavior.
A. Interpretations ofState Responsibility for Militias' Crimes Against
Humanity and Genocide

International law has made clear that a claim that someone engaged in
criminal acts for the beneftt of the state does not absolve the actor of
individual liability. 50 Rather, the criminal acts constitute ultra vires 5 1

protect them,_See, e.g~, David J. Scheffer, Use of Force After the Cold War: Panama, Iraq, and the New
World Order, in RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE I 18 (2d ed., 1991);
Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
USE OF FORCE 41-42 (2d ed., Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. 1991) (noting a right to intervene to
save hostages where the host nation cannot or will not do so). See, also Mary Ann Glendon, A WORLD
MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 60(2001)
(citing Verbatim Record, June 12, 1947, Drafting Committee Meeting (Charles Malik Papers, Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division)) (Rene Cassin stated on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
"The right of interference is here; it is here ... Why? Because we do not want a repetition of what
happened in 1933, where Germany began to massacre its own nationals, and everybody ... bowed,
saying 'Thou art sovereign and master in thine own house."').
49. See, e.g., Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc
N53110 (1998), reprinted in [1998] 2 (Part 2) Y.B. lnt'l L. Comm'n 77, U.N. Doc.
NCN.4/SER.N1998/Add.l (Part 2)(noting that "at the current stage of the development of international
law the notion of'State crimes' in the penal sense was hardly recognized."). The ILC did not preclude
the possibility of State criminality, but removed language in an earlier draft of the Articles on State
Responsibility based in lack of consensus. See id.
50. !d. at 69 (noting the belief of some ILC members that "[a] State acted through its organs,
consisting of natural persons. The individuals who planned and executed the heinous acts of States,
including the leaders of the States, must be held criminally responsible." As the "principle of individual
criminal responsibility applied even to heads of State or Government, which made it possible to deal
with the people at the very highest level who planned and executed crimes, ... [such principle] obviated
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behavior: no actions that contravene peremptory norms 52 of international
law can be absolved by a sovereign state. 53 Therefore, the protections of
sovereignty are not assignable to the individuals taking action on behalf of
the sovereign; 54 the natural persons 55 taking control of state actions would
be held responsible for those actions that contravene international law,
particularly those laws now considered peremptory under international law
without requirement of agreement to an international treaty or convention.
Three international cases involving national support of militia groups
suggest an international recognition that state actors must have control over
the specific actions taken in violation of international law for the
commission of the crime to be attributable to the state. 56 The first, Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua ("Nicar. v. U.S. "), 57
involved the actions of the United States in support of revolutionaries

any need for the notion of State crimes, which [need] would be further reduced by the establishment of
the international criminal court.").
51. Any internationally wrongful act of a State, whether consisting of an action or omission,
entails the international responsibility of that State, where the act is attributable to the State and the act
constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State. See ILC Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83 U.N. Doc. NRES/53/83 (Dec. 12, 2001),
Annex I; Action beyond the legitimate power of the state is beyond the power of the individual party
purporting to act for the state. See id.
52. See, e.g., Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, Art. 37, Report of the Commission the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/5509 (1963), reprinted in [1963] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 198, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1963/ADD.I (noting that "a treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of
general international law").
53. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Art. 26,
Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 (Part 2) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 84, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/200I/Add.l (Part 2)
(noting that no provision can preclude "the wrongfulness of any act of a State which is not in conformity
with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law."); see also Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), Art. 53 (voiding any agreement
between States where the agreement "conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.").
This is true regardless of whether that sovereignty lies in the people of a state or in a power recognized
as exercising authority for the state. CITE ???
54. See 1998 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note
49, at 69.
55. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 4, at Art. 25(1), on Individual Criminal Responsibility
("The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute."); The International
Law Commission Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, supra note 20, at
Art. 4 ("The fact that the present Code provides for the responsibility of individuals for crimes against
the peace and security of mankind is without prejudice to any question of the responsibility of States
under international law.").
56. This is a fuirly narrow interpretation of the customary law as expressed in the Draft Articles
on Responsibility ofStates for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 53, at Art. 8: ("The conduct of a
person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or
group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in
carrying out the conduct.").
57. 19861.C.J. 14 (June 27) (Nicar. v. United States).
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against the Sandinista government ofNicaragua. 58 As discussed below, the
case set a high standard for effective control of a militia for attribution of its
actions to a government. 59
In a second case, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 60 the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") referred back to the
ICJ the Nicaragua v. United States decision. 61 In examining individual
criminal liability following the expulsions and murders, i.e., ethnic
cleansing, stemming from the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the
establishment of boundaries between the former Yugoslav republics, the
ICTY Appeals Chamber recognized that the standard for effective control
had to give regard to the realities of government authority and found that the
effective control test read too narrowly might be insufficient. 62
Finally, in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
decided in February 2007,63 the ICJ 64 clarified its decision in Nicaragua in
determining that Serbia could not be held accountable for the genocide of
approximately seven thousand men and boys at Srebrenica because the
decision to commit genocide was not made until after the forces of the
Bosnian-Serb Army, receiving orders from and acting on behalf of the
Government of the Republika Srpska, 65 had taken Srebrenica. 66 As such,
there was no indication that Serbia had genocidal intent in its support of the
Republika Srpska army. 67 As discussed below, Serbia was still found to
have failed in its responsibilities to prevent and punish the crime of
genocide, 68 but its lack of control over the Bosnian-Serb Army - despite
provisions of materiel, payment of certain officers, issuing of currency, and
shared military strategies of a general and, at times, specific nature prevented a finding of commission of genocide. 69
58. !d. at 16, 20-21.
59. See id. at 64-65.
60. Case No. lT-94-1-A (July 15, 1999)(Tadic (Appeal)).
61. !d.~~ 99-145.
62. See id. ~~ 115-37.
63. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 20 (Feb. 26).
64. The International Court of Justice was established by the Charter of the United Nations as the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations. See ICJ Statute, supra note 19, at Art. I. Only states may
be parties before the ICJ. The International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over natural persons, and
derives its authority from the Rome Statute and its signatories, in relationship with the United Nations
system. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, at Art. 2; Relationship Agreement between the United Nations
and the International Criminal Court, available at untreaty.un.org/untsl144078_158780/7/5/14358.pdf.
65. See Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 2007 I.C.J. 20, '1)'1)231-34 (Bosnian-Serb politicians had
created the Republika Srpska as a Bosnian-Serb government within Bosnia).
66. !d. '1)'1)278, 297,387-88, 396-400.
67. ld.~413.
68. !d. '1)'1)430, 448-50.
69. !d. '1)'1)387-88, 413-15.
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Nicaragua v. United States
In April 1984, the Government of Nicaragua filed a claim against the
United States before the ICJ. 70 Nicaragua claimed that the United States
was engaged in the use of force against the territorial integrity and political
independence of Nicaragua in violation of Art. 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter. 71 The United States Government engaged in a wide range of
activities in support of a challenge to the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua in
the 1980s. The United States participated in the mining of certain ports, 72
placed intelligence agents in Nicaragua, and trained anti-government
revolutionary forces known as the "Contras."73 The United States also
provided tactical material to be used by rebel forces in support of acts that
would be illegal under international law including the murder of adversaries
and refusal to allow free movement of civilians who wished to leave a rebelcontrolled area. 74 The Government ofNicaragua claimed that the acts of the
Central Intelligence Agency as well as the crimes undertaken by the United
States funded and trained Contra soldiers constituted interference with the
internal affairs of a state. 75 The Government of Nicaragua further argued
that the United States should be held liable for any war crimes or crimes
against humanity performed by these U.S.-funded troops. 76 The key
question of attribution of acts performed by the Contras or military and
paramilitary groups using armed force against the Government ofNicaragua
to the United States Government hinged on whether the United States
exercised control over the Contras. 77
The ICJ held that the acts undertaken by the Contras could not be
attributed to the United States as the United States lacked control over the
Contras with regard to those acts. 78
The Court found that the United States through its Central Intelligence
Agency had trained the Contras in "guerrilla warfare, sabotage, demolitions,
and in the use of a variety of weapons, including assault rifles, machine

70. Nicar. v. U.S., 19861.C.J. 14, 16 (June27).
71. /d. at 22.
72. /d. at 21-22.
73. /d. (for proposition of giving U.S. government support to two revolutionary groups known as
the "contras").
74. /d. at 18-19.
75. Nicar. v. U.S., 19861.C.J. at 19.
76. !d. at 20.
77. See id. at 45, 47-51. Central Intelligence Agency operatives that were not U.S. nationals also
acted on behalf of the United States government, but as paid CIA operatives that the CIA itself referred
to as "Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets," or "UCLAs," the ICJ easily determined those operatives to
be under the de jure control of the United States.
78. /d. at 64-65.

2011]

THE CRIMINALIZED STATE

81

guns, mortars, grenade launchers, and explosives," as well as the
transmission of communications that would be difficult for the Government
of Nicaragua to decipher. 79 The United States also provided "regular
salaries from the CIA, and . . . arms (F AL and AK-4 7 assault rifles and
mortars), ammunition, equipment and food," including uniforms, boots,
etc. 80 The ICJ determined that the President of the United States had
engaged in the training and provision of arms to the Contras as part of a
covert operation in the interest of the United States. 81
Despite the provision of salaries, food, equipment, arms, and training,
the ICJ recognized that the United States Government lacked de jure control
over the Contra forces and examined two factors to determine de facto
control:
[W]hether or not the relationship of the contras to the United States
Government was so much one of dependence on the one side and
control on the other that it would be right to equate the contras, for
legal purposes, with an organ of the United States Government, or
as acting on behalf of that Government. 82
First, the ICJ found that proof of complete dependence on the United
States Government was lacking as the contras continued to function even
after the United States Government officially stopped providing anything
but humanitarian aid on September 30, 1984. 83 Thus, the contras were not
dependent on the United States Government for their existence and
continued actions. 84
The Court then determined that United States' participation in
"fmancing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping of the contras, the
selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the planning of the
whole of its operation, is still insufficient in itself," absent evidence "that
the United States directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary
to human rights and humanitarian law alleged by [Nicaragua]."85 Although
the United States was found by the court to have interfered in Nicaragua's
79. See id. at 59, 61. The ICJ also noted that, "(t]he Court finds it clear that a number of military
and paramilitary operations by this force were decided and planned, if not actually by United States
advisers, then at least in close collaboration with them, and on the basis of the intelligence and logistic
support which the United States was able to offer, particularly the supply aircraft provided to the contras
by the United States." Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 61.
80. !d. at 59.
81. /d.at49.
82. /d. at 62.
83. /d.
84. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 62.
85. /d. at 64.
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internal affairs, the control test failed to evidence the United States' de jure
control over the Contras as well as de facto control over specific operations
or over the militia groups generally. 86
The lack of proof of either de jure or de facto control over the militia
group prevented a decision against the United States for state responsibility
for the acts undertaken by the Contras. 87
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Appeal)

The international community revisited the attribution of militia action to
a state in the trial before the ICTY of Dusko Tadic. 88 Before the ICTY was
the question of culpability for crimes under the Geneva Conventions and
whether the accused and the victims were "nationals" of different states
despite having lived in the same geographic area. 89 Specifically, the ICTY
analyzed whether a Bosnian-Serb who, as part of a "greater Serbia"
movement and in conjunction with a Bosnian-Serb army, attacks BosnianMuslims after Serbia officially recognized the separation of Bosnia from
Yugoslavia represents an agent of a Serbian force or merely an individual
who has broken the laws of the Bosnian-Serb republic. 90 The Trial
Chamber and later the Appeals Chamber looked to the Nicaragua control
test as applied to the Contras and stated that the control test for state
responsibility was the same standard that would be applied to determine the
applicability of the Geneva Conventions' "grave breaches" 91 regime
protecting civilians "in the hands of a party to the conflict of which they are

86. !d. at 62. Of note, the decision was rendered on June 27, 1986, and the then-ongoing provision of funds and arms to the contras by the United States was not disclosed until the crash of a supply
plane in the Fall of 1986. See generally H.R. REP. NO. I 00-433 (1987) (the Congressional Committee
Investigating Iran-Contra majority report, issued November 18, 1987).
87. Nicar.v.U.S.,I986l.C.J. at64.
88. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT -94-1-A, Judgment, 'If 117 (July 15, 1999).
As
discussed further below, despite similarities in some portion of the legal analyses, there exist important
differences in the criminal trial of an individual under international law (here, the ICTY) and a conflict
between states adjudicated by the I.C.J.
89. !d. 'If 163-64.
90. !d. '1] 167. If both perpetrator and victim were bound by the laws of the same country (ifTadic
were not acting for Serbia), the victim would not be a "protected person" under the Fourth Geneva
Convention.
91. !d. 'If 134, 138, 163; Geneva Convention (No. IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516., 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (defining grave breaches
of protections to be given to protected persons, including "willful killing, torture ... willfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person."); /d.art. 4(defining persons protected by the Convention as those who "at a
given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the
hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals."). Add note explaining what this is.
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not nationa1s."92 The Trial Chamber reasoned that the claims of breach of
humanitarian law under the Fourth Geneva Convention included as
protected persons "those who, at a given moment and in any manner
whatsoever, fmd themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the
hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not
nationals. " 93 In order to establish a breach of humanitarian law pursuant to
the ICTY statute, the Court first had to decide whether the actions of the
defendant working with the Bosnian-Serb Army ("VRS") could be
attributed to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, (present-day Serbia). 94 If
the actions were attributable to the Bosnian-Serb administration, then the
victims would have shared nationality with the accused and state criminal
law would apply instead of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
On appeal, the court looked to the effective control of Serbia over the
VRS. The Appeals Chamber found effective control over the VRS by the
Government of Yugoslavia until May 1991: the VRS had been part of the
Yugoslavian People's Army ("JNA"), the VRS leaders were still meeting
with Serbian leaders for instructions, and the VRS leaders were receiving
payment from the JNA. 95 Although the leaders of the VRS legally reported
to an entity within Bosnia-Herzegovina, the VRS funds, direction, and goals
were under the control of the government in Belgrade, Serbia. 96
The ICTY's Appeals Chamber found that the VRS did not constitute a
separate entity, but instead remained part of the JNA. 97 The JNA and
government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (present-day Serbia)
92. Tadic, Case No. IT -94-1-A ~ 163-64 (quoting Geneva Convention art. 4, supra note 4).
93. Geneva Convention, supra note 94, at art. 4.
94. Tadic, Case No. IT -94-1-A ~ 14 7.
95. /d.~ 150.
96. /d. The Appeals court noted in footnote 180 that its application of a control test aligned with
those in the dissenting trial court opinion of Judge Macdonald: 'As Judge McDonald noted:
[t]he creation of the VRS [after 19 May 1992] was a legal fiction. The only changes made
after the 15 May 1992 Security Council resolution were the transfer of troops, the
establishment of a Main Staff of the VRS, a change in the name of the military organisation
and individual units, and a change in the insignia. There remained the same weapons, the
same equipment, the same officers, the same commanders, largely the same troops, the same
logistics centres, the same suppliers, the same infrastructure, the same source of payments,
the same goals and mission, the same tactics, and the same operations. Importantly, the
objective remained the same ... The VRS clearly continued to operate as an integrated and
instrumental part of the Serbian war effort.... The VRS Main Staff, the members of which
had all been generals in the JNA and many of whom were appointed to their positions by the
JNA General Staff, maintained direct communications with the VJ General Staff via a
communications link from Belgrade.... Moreover, the VRS continued to receive supplies
from the same suppliers in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) who
had contracted with the JN A, although the requests after 19 May 1992 went through the Chief
of Staff of the VRS who then sent them onto Belgrade.
/d. (Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald, paras. 7 -8).
97. /d.~ 151.
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directed and supervised the activities and operations of the VRS. 98 The
VRS was, therefore, a de facto arm of the Serbian government and the
actions of the VRS could be attributed to the Serbian government. 99
Despite fmding that the Nicaragua test was not necessarily dispositive
in state practice, the Appeals Chamber applied the same standards of
"effective control" over the militia. 100 The Appeals Chamber reasoned that
effective control was synonymous with "overall control" of a state, where
an organized group, engaging in a series of activities, would necessarily
"engage the responsibility of that State for its activities, whether or not each
of them was specifically imposed, requested or directed by the State. " 101
Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

In 2007, the ICJ again reviewed state responsibility for actions taken by
militias in breach of humanitarian law. Bosnia-Herzegovina claimed that
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had itself engaged in genocide and
failed to prevent or punish genocide in contravention of the Convention for
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 102 BosniaHerzegovina claimed that Serbia had financially and strategically supported
the VRS, which had, among other things, engaged in the killing of
approximately eight thousand men and boys between sixteen and sixty-five
years old in the United Nations protected area of Srebrenica. 103
The court examined the International Law Commission's 104 Draft
articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts ("ILC
Articles on State Responsibility") 105 as well as previous determinations by
courts reflecting state responsibility 106 to determine whether Serbia had
98. Tadic, Case No. IT -94-1-A.
99. !d. '1!151. Although the court required an analysis of state responsibility to determine applicable law, the issue of state responsibility was not before the ICTY; rather, the analysis only sought to
determine the application of international humanitarian law to individuals who might otherwise be found
to be nationals of the same country.
100. /d.'1!124.
101. /d. '11122-23.
I 02. Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 2007 I.C.J. 20.
103. !d. at 98-99. Srebrenica served as a protected area for Bosnian-Muslims, guarded by U.N.
peacekeepers in an area between two larger Serbian populations.
104. G.A. Res. 174(11), at 105, U.N. Doc. NRES/504 (Nov. 21, 1947). Created by the General
Assembly in 194 7, the ILC has "for its object the promotion of the progressive development of internationallaw and its codification." Codification entails "the more precise formulation and systematization
of rules of international law in fields where there already has been extensive State practice, precedent
and doctrine." /d. at 107. Thus, the ILC both codifies existing law and suggests the direction law might
take for continued development of customary and treaty-based law.
105. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001 Y.B. on Int'l L. Comm'n,
U.N. Doc. A/56110.
I 06. ICJ Statute, supra note 19, at Art. 38, 59 (1945), references "judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists ... as subsidiary means for the determination of rules oflaw,"
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acted either through a de jure organ of the state, i.e., an institution that has
complete dependence on the state for its existence, or whether it exercised
effective control over a militia when the militia performed specific acts. 107
The court determined that, for instances determined to constitute genocide,
Bosnia-Herzegovina had not proven that the Bosnian-Serb forces were
either a de jure arm of Serbia, as opposed to of the Bosnian Republika
Srpska, 108 or that Serbia had de facto control over the acts by the BosnianSerb forces and the so-called Scorpions, a Serbian militia group that
engaged in killings of Bosnian Muslims near Srebrenica. 109
The court distinguished the Tadic decision, noting that the references in
the ICTY Tadic appellate judgment to state responsibility were not
necessary to the ICTY's determination as the jurisdiction of the ICTY
extends only to crimes committed by natural persons 110 and the ICTY need
not have reached the question of state responsibility to determine an
international nexus for individual criminal acts. Furthermore, the "overall
control" test had what the ICJ referred to as "the major drawback of
broadening the scope of State responsibility well beyond the fundamental
principle governing the law of international responsibility: a State is
responsible only for its own conduct, that is to say the conduct of persons
acting, on whatever basis, on its behalf." 111 Where the persons allegedly
acting for the state lack de jure recognition, that de facto determination of
state responsibility occurs:
where an organ of the State gave the instructions or provided the
direction pursuant to which the perpetrators of the wrongful act
acted or where it exercised effective control over the action during
which the wrong was committed. In this regard the 'overall
control' test is unsuitable, for it stretches too far, almost to breaking

notwithstanding the lack of binding precedential effect. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § I 02 ( 1987) ( noting that the legal opinions issued by international jurists, analyses in legal scholarship, and state practice all may reflect that particular duties or
rights might exist as law in the opinion of the international community.).
107. See generally Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 2007 J.C.J. 20, 137. For effective control, the
paramilitary group or militia would have to act either at the direction of the state in the specific operation, or under the direction or control of the state during the operation. See generally id. ~ ~ 398-407.
108. !d. at 138, 141.
I 09. !d. at 141. Under the JCJ evidentiary rules, (I) it is the litigant seeking to establish a filet who
bears the burden of proving it through the evidence, and (2) any claims against a state involving charges
of exceptional gravity must be proved by evidence that is "fully conclusive." See id. at 139-40.
110. Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 2007 J.C.J. at 144. See also S.C. Res. 1166, ~ 3, U.N. Doc.
SIRES/1166 (May 13, 1998).
Ill. !d. at 144.
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point, the connection which must exist between the conduct of a
State's organs and its international responsibility. 112
Despite a fmding that genocide had indeed occurred, the court found
that the applicant had failed to show that "the massacres were committed on
the instructions, or under the direction of organs of [Serbia]" or that Serbia
"exercised effective control over the operations in the course of which those
113
massacres ... were perpetrated."
In addition to proof of control, BosniaHerzegovina would also have had to show that those in authority in Serbia
had the specific intent (dolus specialis) required under the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ("Genocide
Convention"). 114
The court went on to analyze complicity in the perpetration of genocide
under Convention Art. Ill(e). 115
Without determining whether the
accomplice would need the same specific intent as the perpetrator, the court
noted that the accomplice would need to be aware of the perpetrator's
intent, not only that massacres had taken place or were about to be under
way, but that the perpetrators intended to destroy a protected group in whole
or in part. 116
Despite a finding that Bosnia-Herzegovina lacked proof of Serbia's
control over the killings at Srebrenica, the court did find that the
government in Belgrade failed to exercise whatever authority it might have
applied to prevent the killings at Srebrenica 117 and that it had not turned
over Bosnian-Serb General Ratko Mladic despite indications that General
Mladic remained in Serbia and was revered and protected by a group of
Serbian intelligence officers. 118 This omission constituted a failure to
prevent and punish the crime of genocide. 119
Unfortunately, the court could not determine what damage had been
sustained by the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as no determination had been
made regarding how the exercise of Serbia's authority might have prevented
the genocide. 120 Without such evidence, the court decided that a declaration

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

ld. at 145.
/d.at148.
ld.
Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 20071.C.J. at 149.
Id. at I 5 I.
ld. at I 57-58.
ld. at 160-61.
ld. at 161.
Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 20071.C.J. at 165.
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of failure to comply with the Genocide Convention was a more appropriate
form of relief than financial compensation. 121
B. Applicability of the Law on Militias to the Sudanese Government as
of 2004-Prior to Obligations Recognized by States in the
Responsibility to Protect

Assuming the truth of allegations regarding the actions of Janjaweed
militias against the Sudanese population and those militias' relationships to
the government, what is the effect of a Security Council determination that
the Government of Sudan has failed to disarm these militias and has
manifestly failed to protect its population in Darfur from crimes against
humanity? Rather than argue this, the Office of the Prosecutor focused on
the complete control of President Omar Al-Bashir; 122 however, one might
argue that under the analyses of courts in the cases discussed above, such a
finding would have little or no effect. Such an allegation does not indicate
that the government engaged in a plan to harm the civilian population,
unlike legislators drafting laws requiring the murder of civilians, nor does it
require a fmding that the government sought to assist those in the militia
acting out against the civilian population. 123 The failure to arrest militia
leaders and either prosecute claims against them or allow an international

121. /d. at 165-66.
122. See, e.g., Marlise Simons et al., Arrest is Sought of Sudan Leader in Genocide Case, NY
TIMES, July 15, 2008, at AI, where Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo stated that President al-Bashir had
"masterminded and implemented" the crime of genocide. One reason to focus on an individual government leader is the gravity threshold to bring a case before the ICC. The Trial Chamber recognized
questions that would allow for the Court's jurisdiction: (I) is the conduct of the situation under investigation systematic or large scale, giving consideration to alarm caused to the international community; (2)
whether the person is one of the most senior leaders of the State entity, organization, or armed group in
the situation under investigation; and (3) whether the role of the person in the organization and the role
of the organization in acts and omissions suggest the responsibility of the person in the situation under
the court's consideration. See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmed AI Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision
on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmed AI Bashir (Mar.
4, 2009).
123. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun, ICC- 02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest for Ahmad
harun (Apr. 27, 2007); Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmed AI Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of
Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmed AI Bashir (Mar. 4, 2009). The I.C.C. Office of the Prosecutor has now
made allegations of direct assistance in its indictments of Minister of Interior Ahmad Harun and President Omar AI-Bashir (under the theory that President ai-Bashir exercises complete control over the
apparatus of the State). Although the ICC Office of the Prosecutor appeals at the time of this writing the
Trial Court's refusal to include charges of genocide in the warrant of arrest for President ai-Bashir (on
the theory that the Government of Sudan extends beyond al-Bashir), the court's finding may prevent a
finding that other officials lacked authority to sway or countermand decisions purportedly made by
President al-Bashir. However, this is a far cry from allegations against government actors who may
have prevented peace-keeping or enforcing groups from entering the Darfur region to prevent an ongoing humanitarian crisis.
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tribunal to prosecute is a failure that may not have any penalty in
international courts or within the internal laws of a state.
Alternatively, without proof of a consolidated effort in which .the
government is taking part, any action taken by the international community
would be in violation of the sovereignty of the state when states understand
sovereignty to encompass unilateral and unchecked control of all matters
within the state. As such, the role of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor may
be limited: it can gather evidence of specific acts constituting crimes against
humanity and testimony regarding government officials' roles in planning
and supporting those acts. 124 Indeed, the Office of the Prosecutor has done
so in Darfur through the International Commission of Inquiry instituted by
the Security Council, the Panel of Experts constituted by the Security
Council, the National Commission of Inquiry instituted by the Sudanese
government, and the Office of the Prosecutor's own investigations and
information collected by humanitarian organizations. 125
The ICC Office of the Prosecutor can also gather evidence as to the role
of government funding and support in continued actions taken by the
militias; again, the Office of the Prosecutor has done so, including
information regarding the government's failure to disarm the militias and its
continued arming of the militias through the use of unmarked white
airplanes, disguised as airplanes that might otherwise be delivering aid to
outlying communities. 126 Nevertheless, the lessons from Nicaragua, Dusko
Tadic, and Bosnia and Herzegovina make clear that for an international
body to find governmental responsibility for the militia's actions, the
government would have had to have done more than influence the militias;
the government must have controlled. the specific militia actions. 127 In
Sudan, the Government publicly disavows the Janjaweed militias 128 and,
absent admissions through government records or interviews, proof of
government planning or advance knowledge of specific Janjaweed activities

124. ICC
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/FAQ/FAQ.htm (last visited Oct.
4, 2010).
125. Press Release, ICC, The Prosecutor of the ICC opens investigation in Darfur ICC-OTP-0606104 (Jan. 25, 2005).
126. See Security Council Committee, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to
resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan,~ 89-91,96, U.N. Doc. S/2008/647, (Nov. II, 2008).
127. As discussed further below in section IV, if there is proof that the government knows of the
militia's acts and, exercising general control, evidences an intent for the militia to continue its performance of those acts and protects the militias from repercussions, there may be an argument for aiding
and abetting liability even without control over the specific militia atrocities for which the militia members could be charged.
128. See ICID Report, supra note 12, ~~ 98, 117.
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stems from witness testimony on specific government actors present, or
helicopters or planes to which only government troops had access.
The dilemma of sovereign refusal to act or the inability to identify
sovereign power for attribution of responsibility for decisions in aid of, or
omissions harming, a population in a catastrophic situation leads to the
question: how do we enable immediate action when a government has
manifestly failed to protect its people from the very worst catastrophes?
The arguments surrounding sovereignty had for too long been both a sword
For those arguing against
and shield in international diplomacy.
sovereignty, the allowing for aggression against another state power under
the guise of humanitarian intervention. For those demanding respect for
sovereignty, the delaying of an international response while allowing
internal populations or regional organizations to bear the harms of an
internal catastrophe with tremendous repercussions.
Some have called this view of intervention-those who can intervene at
their own will when they have an interest-Hobbesian, or descended from
the Peace of Westphalia. 129 It denotes a sense of power in the hands of a
few, exercised for the good of the many, but only when the few might have
an interest. The Member States of the United Nations have moved away
from this notion throughout the twentieth century 130 and continue to do so
into the twenty-first century. 131 The question raised by the international
community at the close of the twentieth century was how to move toward a
more equitable recognition of responsibility and state authority with greater
support for rule of law and with continued attention to international peace
and security for all peoples. 132 The international community has responded
thus far through official recognition of the Responsibility to Protect.

129. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Perennial Conflict Between International Criminal Justice and Realpolitik, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 541, 544-45 (2006); Louis Henkin, That 'S' Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, EtCetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. I, 3-4 (1999) (considering that the twentieth century created the transformative development in which "sovereign" states gave
up their "sovereign" right to go to war, and stating that "how a state treats its own citizens even in its
own territory has become a matter of international concern and international law."). In the Peace of
Westphalia, the local princes demanded that power devolve from the Holy Roman Empire to the principalities, based on the actual control exercised by the princes.
130. For example, in recognizing human rights norms as international law, the universality of
jurisdiction for international crimes, etc.
131. See Rome Statute, supra note 4; The Int'l Commission On Intervention and State Sovereignty
[ICISS], The Responsibility to Protect, (200 I), available at http://www.iciss.calreport-en.asp [Hereinafter ICISS Report].
132. See, e.g., Scheffer, supra note 48, at 154-155 (noting a move toward collective decision
making and military action, even where the violation of international law may not have a direct bearing
on a specific United States national interest).
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PART III: "WE THE PEOPLES:" THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND A
JUST APPROACH TO INTERVENTION

The arguments between a call for military intervention and the rights of
a state to maintain its sovereignty have played out over a number of years in
different contexts. In an address to the United Nations General Assembly in
2000, Secretary General Kofi Annan asked how the international
community could get past the impasse between those states that feared
encroachment on their sovereignty and those states calling for immediate
action to prevent or respond to catastrophes that shocked the conscience,
calling for the urgency ofhumanity. 133
A. TheiCISS
1. Articulation of a Responsibility to Protect

The Canadian Government, along with a group of nongovernmental
foundations, responded to this call by Secretary Annan by sponsoring an
independent consortium, the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty ("ICISS"), to research this question and offer
recommendations. 134 Made up of scholars, practitioners, and diplomats
engaging in discussion roundtables in states around the world, the ICISS
spent more than a year in the development of a consensus document
reflecting the understanding of where the issues of sovereignty and
intervention stood, and where many in the international community believe
they need to go. 135
In December 2001, the ICISS presented a report that shifted the
discussion between the humanitarian interventionists on the one hand and
the sovereign rightists on the other, to the interests of a third side: the
individuals at risk or, at least, the interest of the international community in
the protection of individuals through the application of a responsibility to
protect. 136 In signing the U.N. Charter, Member States recharacterized their
sovereignty from the concept of sovereignty as control to the broader idea
of sovereignty as responsibility, at least as to the obligations of customary
intemationallaw. 137 The ICISS noted:
The defence of state sovereignty, by even its strongest supporters,
does not include any claim of the unlimited power of a state to do
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

ICISS Report, supra note 131, '1!1.6.
/d.'l!l.7.
Seeidatvii-viii.
/d. '1: 2.29.
/d. 'li'f2.14-2.15.
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what it wants to its own people. . . . It is acknowledged that
sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally- to respect the
sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the dignity and
basic rights of all the people within the state. In international
human rights covenants, in UN practice, and in state practice itself,
sovereignty is now understood as embracing this dual
responsibility.
Sovereignty as responsibility has become the
minimum content of good international citizenship. 138
As contemplated by the ICISS, the language shift from "the right to
humanitarian intervention" to "the responsibility to protect" also shifts the
focus from parties claiming a right to act, whether in good faith or not, to
the communities suffering from a lack of protection. 139 The need for what
some had previously conceived as a permissive right of intervention would
transform into:
a residual responsibility [that] lies with the broader community of
states . . . when a particular state is clearly either unwilling or
unable to fulfill its responsibility to protect or is itself the actual
perpetrator of crimes or atrocities; or where people living outside a
particular state are directly threatened by actions taking place
there. 140
Of considerable note, the ICISS Report reminds us that, in the arc of the
state, and residual international, responsibility to protect-which ranges in
obligation from the prevention of an avoidable catastrophe, to providing a
timely and appropriate reaction to the catastrophe, to rebuilding following
that state or international reaction-prevention is the most important
141
However,
dimension, to which far more resources must be dedicated.
approximately two-thirds of the ICISS synopsis and a majority of the report
focuses on "the most controversial" means of intervening "against a state or
its leaders, without its or their consent, for purposes which are claimed to be
humanitarian or protective" military intervention for human protection
purposes-a small but likely vital component of the responsibility to

138. !CISS Report, supra note 131, ~1.35; see id. at ~ 2.18 (following on a discussion on the
UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR reflecting a shift from a culture of violence to a more enlightened culture
of peace, the Commission noted: "What has been gradually emerging is a parallel transition from a
culture of sovereign impunity to a culture of national and international accountability.").
139. /d.~ 2.29.
140. /d. ~ 2.31.
141. /d.,~~3.1-3.3.
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. m
. t he context of t h e processes necessary to ensure a JUSt
. an d
protect. 142 It ts
reasonable purpose and authority in going to war (jus ad bellum) in an
international military response that the ICISS suggested parameters on
intervention. The ICISS Report, however, is "very much concerned with
alternatives to military action, including all forms of preventive measures,
and coercive intervention measures - sanctions and criminal prosecutions falling short of military intervention." 143 Such coercive measures would
serve either a preventive purpose "to avoid the need for military
intervention arising" or a reactive purpose "as an alternative to military
force." 144 As discussed below, reference to the International Criminal
Court, which had not yet come into operation as of the release of the ICISS
Report, might serve both the preventive and reactive function, depending on
the perceived need for military intervention.
2. Intervention Under the ICISS Report

The ICISS would ultimately provide the blueprint for the United
Nations' Responsibility to Protect. As such, some of the salient features of
the ICISS Report, particularly with regard to intervention, humanitarian
relief, and issues of sovereignty, provide the analytical context for the uses
and application of the Responsibility to Protect.
In drafting the ICISS Report, the ICISS recognized a number of
decisions that would need to be made on appropriate military intervention in
support of the international community's residual responsibility to protect,
starting with the limited occurrence of intervention. Military intervention

142. ICISS Report, supra note 131, ~ 1.38. (This article adopts the use ofthe term "intervention"
as defined by the Commission for the purpose of the perceived competing notions of intervention and
sovereignty. It is in this context that the Commissioners discuss "intervention against a state or its leaders, without its or their consent, for purposes which are claimed to be humanitarian or protective."
Intervention against the will of state actors undermines the sovereignty of the state as exercised through
its government, in that intervening actions are taken contrary to those who purport to govern just what
actions may take place. However, the intervention purports to be in resolution of a crisis, and not specifically to undermine the government. The notion that military intervention to protect a population (such
as a peace-enforcing force) necessarily stands against the government reintroduces a conflictintervention versus sovereign authority-that much of the rest of the report deftly diminishes in its focus
on the safety of endangered populations. A government seeking to maintain its sovereignty might wish
to withhold judgment on a proposed limited international intervention, if that international cohort can
reestablish order toward negotiations with the government by insurgents, or reintroduction of a recogni zable and respected government police power in an area under looser government control, where either
side to the conflict feels it benefits from the disorder.).
143. /d. 'f 1.35.
144. /d. 'f 1.38.
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was to follow principles of jus ad bellum 145 and only to occur under
"exceptional circumstances in which the very interest that all states have in
maintaining a stable international order requires them to react ... when civil
conflict and repression are so violent that civilians are threatened with
massacre, genocide or ethnic cleansing on a large scale." 146 In those
circumstances, the international community must recognize that "the aim of
the human protection operation is to enforce compliance with human rights
and the rule of law as quickly and as comprehensively as possible, but it is
not to defeat the state." 147
It is important to consider what the responsibility to protect is and what
it is not. The ICISS states quite often that reaction through military
coercion is a last resort and suggested that "[c]easefrres, followed, if
necessary, by the deployment of international peacekeepers and observers
are always a better option, if possible, than coercive military responses." 148
With regard to proportional meanshe scale, duration and intensity of the
planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure
the humanitarian objective in question[.] The effect on the political system
of the country targeted should be limited, again, to what is strictly necessary
to accomplish the purpose of the intervention." 149
The ICISS also suggests that the parameters of international
humanitarian law should be more strictly observed in an international
military intervention "since military intervention involves a form of military
action significantly more narrowly focused and targeted than all out
warfighting[. )" 150
Finally, the concept of reasonable prospects creates certain limitations
on military intervention: (1) "intervention is not justified where actual
protection cannot be achieved, or if the consequences of embarking upon
the intervention are likely to be worse than if there is no action at all" 151 and
(2) the ICISS recognizes that "on purely utilitarian grounds [the
precautionary principle would] be likely to preclude military action against
any one of the five members of the Security Council [and other major
powers who are not permanent members of the Security Council] even if all
other conditions for intervention ... were met." 152 Despite this gap in the
145. !d. ~ 4.16. (Criteria for military intervention were to include: "right authority, just cause, right
intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects.").
146. /d.~ 4.13.
147. IClSS Report, supra note 131,, 7.51.
148. /d. ~ 4.38.
149. /d.~ 4.39.
150. /d.~ 4.40.
151. /d. ~4.41.
152. ICISS Report, supra note 131, ~ 4.42.
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implementation of the Responsibility to Protect caused by certain powerful
states, the ICISS recommended that interventions be used in the few
necessary situations where possible and that other collective actions be
considered as part of the responsibility to protect where interventions had
limited prospects for success. 153
After any intervention, the contemplated responsibility to protect would
include a responsibility to rebuild and, assuming limited loss of de facto
control of the government in internal affairs, reestablishment of the internal
apparatus of the state. 154 In prevention, reaction, and rebuilding, it is critical
that "those wanting to help from outside recognize and respect the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries concemed." 155 Next, it
is critical that the intervention endeavors "to sustain forms of government
compatible with the sovereignty of the state in which the enforcement has
occurred- not undermin[e] that sovereignty." 156 Finally, it is critical that
"the responsibility to rebuild, which derives from the obligation to react,
must be directed towards returning the society in question to those who live
in it, and who, in the last instance, must take responsibility together for its
future destiny." 157
Another major component of the ICISS Report reviews "The Question
of Authority." The ICISS acknowledges that the U.N. Charter specifically
prohibits "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state" and intervention "in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." 158 Only Security
Council recognition of a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression" allows for measures such as embargoes, sanctions, the
severance of diplomatic relations, and where those measures are likely to be
inadequate, the taking of "such action by air, sea or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." 159 Other
than "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the U.N.," 160 the Charter includes no
language overcoming domestic jurisdiction of the state as reflected in
Articles 2.4 and 2. 7. Thus, the best way to move forward would require
some type of Security Council approval. That Security Council decision
would require evidence of some kind, ideally from a "universally respected
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

/d.~~ 4.42-4.43.
Id.,~5.31.

/d. '~ 3.35.
/d. ~ 5.26.
ICISS Report, supra note 131, 'f 5.31.
U.N.Charterart.2,~~4, 7.
ICISS Report, supra note 131, ~ 6.3; U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41, 42.
ICISS Report, supra note 131, ~ 6.4; U.N. Charter art. 51.
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and impartial non-government source." 161
However, as independent,
nongovernmental organizations seek to remain absolutely removed from
political decision making, the ICISS suggests reliance on reports prepared
by U.N. organs and agencies "in the normal course of their operations" 162 or
an independent special fact-finding mission sent by the Security Council or
Secretary-General. 163
When there is no Security Council approval and the matter is not under
Security Council consideration, the ICISS recognizes two other
possibilities: (1) action by the General Assembly of the United Nations
under an Emergency Special Session pursuant to the Uniting for Peace
resolution of 1950 164 or (2) action by states or regional organizations,
perhaps seeking Security Council authorization ex post facto. 165 The ICISS
Report makes clear that any action taken outside of the United Nations
framework relating to international peace and security "run[s] the risk of
eroding [the United Nations'] authority in general and also undermining the
principle of a world order based on international law and universal
166
norms. "
However, lack of action where unauthorized ad hoc coalitions actually
intervene successfully, observing and respecting the parameters laid out in
the responsibility to protect would have "enduringly serious consequences
for the stature and credibility of the U.N. itself." 167 That said, the ICISS
saw its task as "not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of
authority, but to make it work much better than it has," 168 stressing that the
Commission "ha[s] made abundantly clear our view that the Security
Council should be the first port of call on any matter relating to military
.
.
c:
h uman protectiOn
. purposes. "169
mtervenhon
10r
The High-Level Panel Report Articulating a Responsibility to Protect

The issue of the responsibility to protect was again taken up by the U.N.
Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
("Panel") in the 2004 report entitled "A more secure world: Our shared

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

ICISS Report, supra note 131, ~ 4.29.
!d. ~ 4.30.
!d. ~ 4.31.
G.A. Res. 377(V), ~ A(l), U.N. Doc. NRES/377(V) (Nov. 3, 1950).
See ICISS Report, supra note 131, ~ 6.7.
!d. , ~ 6.9.
!d. ~ 6.40.
!d. , ~ 8.4.
!d. ,~ 6.28.
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responsibility" (the "High-level Panel Report"). 170 While operating with a
broader mandate than the ICISS, the Panel recognized - or adopted - the
idea:
In signing the Charter of the United Nations, States not only benefit
from the privileges of sovereignty but also accept its
responsibilities. Whatever perceptions may have prevailed when
the Westphalian system first gave rise to the notion of State
sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a State
to protect the welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to
the wider international community. 171

This report focused more on the collective security concerns when a
state is not "able, or willing, to meet its responsibilities to protect its own
people and avoid harming its neighbours." 172 The Panel called for the
involvement of the international community, "acting in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, to help build the necessary capacity or supply the necessary
protection, as the case may be." 173 While the Panel recognized that "the
multilateral system as we now know it ... has shown that it can perform,"
the High-level Panel Report sought to strengthen the collective security of
.
. 1 commumty.
. 174
the mtemahona
The Panel spoke to the breadth of the Security Council's authority in
cases of states posing threats to other states, people outside its borders, or to
international order generally:
[T]he language of Chapter VII is inherently broad enough, and has
been interpreted broadly enough, to allow the Security Council to
approve any coercive action at all, including military action, against
a State when it deems this 'necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security'. That is the case whether the
threat is occurring now, in the imminent future or more distant
future; whether it involves the State's own actions or those of nonState actors it harbours or supports; or whether it takes the form of

170. The Secretary-General, Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit, ~ 20 I, U.N.
Doc. N59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004). [Hereinafter High-Level Panel Report].
171. /d. ~ 29.
172. /d.~ 29.
173. /d.
174. /d. ~ 31.. See also High-Level Panel Report, supra note 170, Synopsis, at 3 ("The task is not
to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make it work better than it
has.").

2011]

THE CRJMINALIZED STATE

97

an act or omission, an actual or potential act of violence or simply a
challenge to the Council's authority. 175
With that breadth comes a limitation on certain individual states'
expectations:
It may be that some States will always feel that they have the

obligation to their own citizens, and the capacity, to do whatever
they feel they need to do, unburdened by the constraints of
collective Security Council process. But however understandable
that approach may have been in the cold war years, when the United
Nations was manifestly not operating as an effective collective
security system, the world has now changed and expectations about
legal compliance are very much higher. 176
Recognizing arguments for bypassing a Security Council perceived as
inconsistent and not fully responsive to "very real State and human security
needs," the Panel suggests that "the solution is not to reduce the Council to
impotence and irrelevance: it is to work from within to reform it, including
in the ways we propose in the present report." 177
The Report looks to the active participation of the Security Council in
military interventions in which a state engages in or fails to prevent
humanitarian harms against the state's citizens. 178 While recognizing that
there has been
a long-standing argument in the international community between those
who insist on a 'right to intervene' in man-made catastrophes and those who
argue that the Security Council, for all its powers under Chapter VII [of the
U.N. Charter] to 'maintain or restore international security', is prohibited
from authorizing any coercive action against sovereign States for whatever
happens within their borders, the Panel recognized the jus cogens authority
of the Genocide Convention, and the expansions and limitations on
sovereignty imposed by it. 179 States, both as signatories to the Genocide
175. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 170, '1]193.
176. /d. '1]196.
177. /d.'1]197.
178. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 170, '1]20 I. Of particular note, "avoidable catastrophe"
for which every state is responsible includes "mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate starvation and exposure to disease." The "avoidable catastrophe" aligns
itself in this report with the intentional acts of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity with
which the International Criminal Court occupies itself. This reading distances the High-Level Panel
Report from a broader reading of a responsibility to protect in the ICISS report. See generally, ICISS
Report, supra note 131, at 11-18.
179. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 170, '1]199. The expansion of sovereignty would stem
from protections of sovereign peoples against State leaders allowing or instigating harms against popula-
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Convention and under international peremptory norms, "have agreed that
genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime
under international law which they undertake to prevent and punish." 180
Because genocide, wherever it occurs, is a:
threat to the security of all and should never be tolerated, ... [t]he
principle of non-intervention in internal affairs cannot be used to
protect genocidal acts or other atrocities, such as large-scale
violations of international humanitarian law or large-scale ethnic
cleansing, which can properly be considered a threat to international
security and as such provoke action by the Security Council. 181
The Panel recognized blanket authority for Security Council action:
the [Security] Council and the wider international community have
come to accept that, under Chapter VII and in pursuit of the
emerging norm of a collective international responsibility to protect,
[the Security Council] can always authorize military action to
redress catastrophic internal wrongs if it is prepared to declare that
the situation is a 'threat to international peace and security', not
especially difficult when breaches of international law are
involved. 182
This serves not just to legitimate actions taken purporting to be
humanitarian, but to slow actions that would be taken without proper
authority: "That [armed military] force can legally be used does not always
mean that, as a matter of good conscience and good sense, it should be
used." 183 Following the 2003 United States intervention into Iraq, 184 the
tions, while the limitation on sovereignty would prevent State leaders as holders in trust of the peoples'
sovereign rights, from maintaining primary jurisdiction over situations where large-scale atrocities occur
to their populations.
180. ld.. ~ 200. See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A,
U.N. Doc. N6316, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 16, 1966) Arts. 4(2) and 6(3).
181. Quoting High-Level Panel Report, supra note 170, ~ 200.
182. Id. ~ 202. The "emerging norm" seems not to stem from a growth or change in authority
with the Security Council, but rather in Security Council consistency in applying an international responsibility to intervene for human protection, creating less room for other actors to claim Security
Council inertia or lack of political will.
183. Id. at Synopsis, 3 (emphasis in original). See also id. ~ 205.
184. See Id. ~ 186 ("There is little evident international acceptance of the idea of security being
best preserved by a balance of power, or by any single - even benignly motivated - superpower.");
High-level Panel Report, supra note 170, Annex II, Terms of Reference I: "The past year has shaken the
foundations of collective security and undermined confidence in the possibility of collective responses to
our common problems and challenges. It has also brought to the fore deep divergences of opinion on the
range and nature of the challenges we face and are likely to face in the future." See also, Jd. -,Annex I~
53, noting that "Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations should be neither rewritten nor reinter-
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Report takes special care to focus on multilateralism and the presumption
that even a unilateral power with proper information should look toward the
imprimatur of the Security Council as allowing even a well-intentioned
power to act unilaterally as it sees fit would set a precedent for all powers to
act in the same way. 185
Although like the ICISS in speaking to the importance of action taken
by the Security Council in support of the Responsibility to Protect and
despite the Report being addressed to the Secretary-General, the Panel
noted, "many of our recommendations will require commitment from and
action by heads of Government. Only through their leadership can we
realistically forge the new consensus required to meet the threats described
in our report." 186
The Security Council would be the primary mover in engaging in
interventions when there have been findings from impartial sources such as
the International Committee of the Red Cross that a state has failed to
protect its population. By being a first actor, the Security Council would
both prevent unilateral action by establishing the Security Council as the
"primary body in the collective security system," 187 and create respect for
rule of law and jus ad bellum in military interventions, so that the analysis
can go "directly not to whether force can legally be used but whether, as a
matter of good conscience and good sense, it should be." 188 The Panel
recognized a set of guidelines or "five criteria of legitimacy" for the use of
the Security Council and any others involved in consideration of
authorization or application of military force: (1) seriousness of threat; (2)
proper purpose; (3) last resort; (4) proportional means; and (5) balance of
consequences. 189
The Report focuses on a range of issues and the use of force as part of
collective security presumes attempts at peaceful prevention and substantial
resources and planning toward peace-building and civilian protection after

preted, either to extend its long-established scope (so as to allow preventive measures to non-imminent
threats) or to restrict it (so as to allow its application only to actual attacks)." Again, this follows on
arguments that no such collective action was required as part of a potential New World Order following
the 1991 Iraq war, and end of the cold war. Scheffer, supra, note. 48, 126-127; High-Level Panel Report,
supra note 170, 'lJ 191 ("For those impatient with such a response, the answer must be that, in a world
full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the global order and the norm of non-intervention on which
it continues to be based is simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventive action, as distinct
from collectively endorsed action, to be accepted. Allowing one to so act is to allow all.").
185. /d. ml190-192.
186. /d. at Transmission Letter, xi.
187. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 170, '1!205.
188. /d.(emphasis in original).
189. !d. 'lJ207 (emphasis in original).
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use of force. 190 In applying the five basic criteria of legitimacy, the Panel
sought to do three things: "[1] to maximize the possibility of achieving
Security Counsel consensus around when it is appropriate or not to use
coercive action, including armed force; [2] to maximize international
support for whatever the Security Council decides; and [3] to minimize the
possibility of individual Member States bypassing the Security Council." 191
The Panel sought the endorsement of the Security Council, General
Assembly, and individual Member States not on the norm of a responsibility
to protect, but on the standard for application of that responsibility to the
last resort of armed force through the Security Council.
The Panel also endorsed the emerging norm that there is a collective
international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council
authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide
and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of
international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved
powerless or unwilling to prevent. 192 In addition to use of military force,
the Panel also noted that toward prevention of international or interstate
conflicts, the Security Council "should stand ready to use the authority it
has under the Rome Statute to refer cases to the International Criminal
Court." 193 The Panel stated that, from a legal process perspective, "there
have been few more important recent developments than the Rome Statute
creating the International Criminal Court," and where conflict is mounting,
"early indication by the Security Council that it is carefully monitoring the
conflict in question and that it is willing to use its powers under the Rome
Statute might deter parties from committing crimes against humanity and
violating the laws ofwar." 194
After being informed by the reports of the ICISS and the Panel, the
Secretary-General addressed the General Assembly 195 in March 2005 and
reported on the Responsibility to Protect. Among his comments, he sought
recognition by the Security Council of the basic criteria for legitimacy of
approved military force in response to international threats to peace and
security such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other crimes against

190. See generally, id. '\l'\1224-236.
191. !d.~ 206.
192. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 170, '1!203.
193. /d. 'II 90. Again, the Security Council may use coercive action under its Chapter VII authority, including, but not limited to, armed force. Reference to the International Criminal Court is one such
use of coercive power.
194. /d.
195. The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human
Rights for All, '1!135, U.N. Doc, A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 S.G. Report].
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humanity. 196 He also recognized that sovereignty should never shield
genocide, crimes against humanity, and mass human suffering. 197 Finally,
he suggested the international community take concrete steps to reduce
selective application, arbitrary enforcement, and breach without
consequence, including "mov[ing] towards embracing and acting on the
'responsibility to protect' potential or actual victims of massive
atrocities" 198 .
The United Nations General Assembly and World Leaders' Articulation
of a Responsibility to Protect

In September 2005, the United Nations General Assembly presented the
2005 World Summit Outcome, 199 a document reflecting agreement from the
world leaders that had participated in a historic summit at the U.N. on
behalf oftheir states following the Millennium Summit of2000. 200
Among the points recognized at the 2005 summit was the responsibility
of each government to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. 201 Again, the notion that one
function of government is the protection of groups and individuals subject
to the law of the state was not new; the International Commission oflnquiry
for Darfur argued in January 2005 that the responsibility is found in human
rights law and humanitarian law. 202
In his 2000 address to the General Assembly, then Secretary-General
Kofi Annan brought attention to the founding documents of the United
Nations as signed by governments, but only as representatives of "the
peoples" of the United Nations. 203 However, the 2005 and 2006 resolutions
of the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council coalesced m one
196. !d.~~ 125-26.
197. /d.~I29.
198. ld~~ 131-32.
199. G.A. Res. 60/1, ~ I, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
200. !d. at~ 3 (reaffirming G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. AIRES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000).
20 I. The prohibitions of these crimes are often recognized as peremptory norms binding on all
states, and national laws recognizing, and implementing state punishments against these crimes are
commonplace. The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
requires that all signatories undertake the implementation of laws to punish genocidaires; all states are
obligated to proceed against these gross violations of human rights. See G.A. Res. 3/260, art. I, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/31260 (Dec. 9, 1948).
202. See ICID Report, supra, note 12, ~ 143-144. In his RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, Hugo
Grotius observed "that kingdoms are not so much a patrimony ... as a trust, placed in the hands of the
sovereign for the benefit of his people. Indeed kings themselves are aware of this, even before the crown
descends upon their heads, and they receive it upon condition of adhering to such sacred obligations."
GROTIUS, supra note 48, at 386.
203. KOFI ANNAN, 'WE THE PEOPLES:' THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY
6 (2000).
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recognizable document the large-scale international recogmtwn of the
ability-or responsibility--of the United Nations to act when a government
has failed to protect its populations from genocide, crimes against humanity,
ethnic cleansing, or war crimes. 204 The resolutions further expand on a
responsibility that is the logical conclusion of reading international treaties
like the Rome Statute205 in acting to limit the harm caused by those
atrocities, even when such harm does not have an ostensible and immediate
nexus with others in the international community. 206 Such a shift moves
from an idealistic perspective of human rights as enforceable through
sovereign allowance toward a functional use of international peacekeepers
to eliminate the greatest harms to the international community. 207
PART IV: APPLICATION OF THE RESPONSilliLITY TO PROTECT TO THE
SITUATION OF DARFUR, SUDAN

Numerous people have called on the international community to act in
response to the continuing conflict in Darfur, citing the Responsibility to
Protect resolution as one basis for the necessity of an immediate response
by the United Nations Security Council. 208 The lack of armed military
intervention by the United Nations has caused many to question whether the
Responsibility to Protect resolution remains primarily aspirational and lacks
the necessary strength to prevent the crimes the resolution purports to
address. 209 By combining the attributed responsibility for the support of
militias with the obligations to protect the human rights of their populations
and apply humanitarian law as most fully recognized in the Responsibility
to Protect resolution, the ICC can investigate and prosecute government
204. U.N. Doc. N59/2005 ~'11 7(b), 129, 134; U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (2006) ~4 (citing
NRES/60/1 Paragraphs 138-139).
205. Rome Statute, supra note 4, at Preamble; see id. at arts. 5-8.
206. See S.C. Res. 1674, supra note 18, at art. I where the Security Council reaffirmed the World
Summit Outcome provisions on the "responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity." See a/so RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 102 cmts. band c, and Reporters' Note 2: A resolution, declaration, or
other statement of principles contributes to the making of customary international law, as both (I) the
statements and votes of governments are kinds of state practice, and (2) states follow it from a sense of
legal obligation (opinio juris sive necessitates).
207. Indeed, as previously noted, the Rome Statute recognizes that in ending impunity for perpetrators of the crimes within the court's jurisdiction, "it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes, [and] that the international Criminal Court ..
. shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions." Rome Statute, supra note 4, at Preamble.
208. See UN News Service, supra, note 33; Evans, supra note 33. It should be noted that Gareth
Evans served both as a co-chair of the ICISS, and as a member of the High-level Panel.
209. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 33; cf Mai-Linh K. Hong, A Genocide by Any Other Name:
Language, Law, and the Response to Darfor, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 235,270 (2008), suggesting the Responsibility to Protect makes the "moral obligation to act more difficult to ignore when atrocities are occurring."
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actors for aiding, or complicity with, militias when a government fails to
protect its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
or ethnic cleansing.
If effectively enforced, the potential for prosecution of individuals in
governmental authority for crimes, by entities like the International
Criminal Court, will give those leaders incentives to deter further crimes
even if the international community lacks the resources or the will to
challenge the actions or inaction of the state engaging in, or allowing others
to engage in, crimes against humanity. The potential prosecution of
government actors for the refusal to allow, or the substantial delay in
allowing, an international force for the limited purpose of protecting
populations affected by crimes against humanity, genocide, ethnic
cleansing, or war crimes can be an important incentive for leaders to protect
their own populations if for no other reason than to avoid potential
prosecution before the ICC. 210
Government Control over the Jarijaweed Militias

The ICID provided the Security Council with information of joint
attacks on villages by Janjaweed militias with Government of Sudan air
support, by militias with Popular Defence Forces insignias on their
uniforms, and Janjaweed militias of which local police officers were
members?'' The ICID, however, relied on the analysis in the Tadic
(Appeal) judgment that related to state responsibility for actions of militias
over which the state has general control. By incorporating the Janjaweed

210. Deterrence of violations requires some degree of enforcement. See Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. &
Mont., 2007 I.C.J. 91, ~ 426 (Feb. 26) ("one of the most effective ways of preventing criminal acts, in
general, is to provide penalties for persons committing such acts, and to impose those penalties effectively on those who commit the acts one is trying to prevent."). Previous judicial decisions evidence
international enforcement of and concern with acts that states have declared violations of international
law. For example, though Article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states, "the
decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular
case," the pronouncement of an interpretation of international law will likely be reviewed and looked to
as a statement of the law in a future proceeding with similar circumstances. ICJ Statute, supra note 19,
at Art. 59. See, e.g., Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 2007 J.C.J. 91, in which the court distinguished
between government liability for the purposes of finding an international act (which the ICTY did in the
1999 Tadic decision), and the ICJ decision on the denial of liability by a government in the dispute
between Nicaragua and the United States in 1986, where the United States lacked operation control over
the Contras' acts violating human rights norms. See generally Nicar. v. U.S.,I986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
See a/so RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 103, on Evidence of International Law: " ... (2) In determining whether a rule has become international law, substantial weight is accorded to (a) judgments and opinions of international judicial and arbitral tribunals...."
211. See, e.g., ICID Report, supra note 12, ~~ 116, 125.
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militias into the PDF, the Commission stated that the Government of Sudan
had incurred the responsibility for the militias' actions. 212
However, as noted previously, in order to attribute Janjaweed acts to the
Government of Sudan, international jurists following the ICJ decision in
Bosnia v. Serbicl 13 may require greater proof of control over the militias to
conform to the ICJ understanding of Article 8 of the Articles of State
Responsibility. The ICC would need to determine whether the militias were
de jure organs of the state that were controlled by the Government, allied
with the Government, and whether the relationship changed over time. As
of August 2006, the Government of Sudan continued to ship weapons into
Darfur that might assist the militias and allow for their continued existence.
Such provision of arms would suggest either: (1) complicity or aiding and
abetting liability; (2) a failure to prevent or repress crimes against humanity
or genocide; or (3) actions taken by the Government where it lacks police
powers to control the population.
The Provision of Weapons: Aiding and Abetting Crimes, Failure to
Protect Against Crimes, or Actions within a Region Outside the
Government's Control

The ICID notes that the Government of Sudan had undertaken to disarm
the Janjaweed militias and had failed to do so. 214 The ICID and Panel of
Experts did, however, present evidence of the Government of Sudan arming
the militias through the local governments' recruiting efforts for the PDF. 215
If the Janjaweed were determined to be an entity separate from the PDF and
not to have been coordinated through the central government, the
Government's alleged permissive attitude toward the Janjaweed's access to
weapons might indicate: (I) aiding and abetting of the Janjaweed militias'
crimes if the Government had reason to believe those crimes would occur;
(2) the failure to protect the population by not reacting once the militias'
crimes were occurring; or (3) a failed or weakened state situation in which
the actions of the militias were not within the Government's control. On the
premise that punishment or an end to impunity is one manner to prevent a
criminal act, the ability to punish for each of the stated possibilities would
further limit the harms stemming from such acts. The Rome Statute not
only limits the jurisdictional timeframe of the Office of the Prosecutor for
the ICC but also requires that crimes be adjudicated as drafted in the Rome
212. /d.~ 125.
213. See Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 2007 l.C.J. at t~ 391-394.
214. See ICID Report, supra note 12, 'IM]98, 118, 126.
215. Seeid.~lll.
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Statute, that crimes not be extended by analogy, and that ambiguity be
interpreted in favor of the accused. 216 Thus, any interpretation of the statute
must adhere to the language of the statute and reflect existing international
law.
a. Aiding and Abetting or Complicity
An aiding and abetting analysis, other than one based on a failure to
protect, would be based on an act taken by the Government actors. Did the
Government actors engage their liability by committing crimes alongside
the Janjaweed militias? Did the Government actors order, solicit, or induce
the crimes? Either of these acts would make the Government actor a coperpetrator directly responsible for the crimes of the Janjaweed. 217
Prosecutions of such actions would engage the responsibility of
commanders and other superiors218 as the command structure would have
However, criminal
knowledge of the subordinates' actions. 219
responsibility requires the mental elements of intent and knowledge of the
underlying crimes-the government actor must have knowledge that the
circumstance exists or that a consequence will occur in the ordinary course
of events, and must intend to engage in the conduct, or cause the
consequence to occur. 220 Direct participation in crimes against humanity or
genocide would certainly allow for a fmding of command responsibility. 221
However, an individual's responsibility might also be incurred if the
individual, "for the purpose of facilitating commission of the crime, aids,
abets, or otherwise assists in [the crime's] commission or attempted
commtsswn, including [by] providing means for [the crime's]
commission."222 As stated previously, proof of aiding and abetting liability
may be difficult in the ftrst instance based on the number of arms and
uniforms ~rovided to disbanded militias from previous wars over previous
decades. 22 Even with regard to the conflict in Darfur, the provision of

216. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, at Art. 22(2): "The definition of a crime shall be strictly
construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted
in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted."
217. Seeid.atArt.25(3)(a-b).
218. /d. at Art. 28. The forces would be under the effective control of the military commander,
and a superior (military or civilian) with responsibility for the action of subordinates with the knowledge
that the subordinates are committing or are about to commit such crimes would be individually responsible.
219. See id. at Art. 30, (3).
220. See id. at Art. 30.
221. See id. at Art. 28.
222. /d. at Art. 25(3)(c).
223. See id. at Art. 30.
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weapons has certainly occurred but for the purpose of counter-insurgency 224
and not to militias that government actors believed to be active in crimes
. humamty.
. 225
agamst
Similarly, the type of joint criminal enterprise analysis suggested by the
ICID Report and possible under another reading of complicity in the Rome
Statute requires that the accused intentionally "contribute to the commission
or attempted commission of a crime under the statute by a group of persons
acting with a common purpose." 226 Such a contribution can be made
without the accused sharing the criminal purpose if the accused contributes
to the group's goal. 227 If the government actors providing weapons to the
Janjaweed militia groups believe they are supporting legal militias, the
contribution would not necessarily entail criminal liability. 228
b. Failure to Protect: Allowing Populations to Suffer from Militia Attacks

Even where no proof of widespread government involvement exists,
assuming the numbers alleged by the Office of the Prosecutor of 35,000
civilians killed between 2003 and 2005 with another 80,000 to 265,000
dying slow deaths based on conditions brought on by Janjaweed and
govermnent attacks, certainly the Government of Sudan would have a
responsibility to prevent and repress harms. 229 From a standard incurring
criminal liability before the ICC, superior responsibility would be
implicated only if the superior knew or consciously disregarded the crimes
or potential crimes, the militias' activities were within the effective
responsibility and control of the Government, and the Government failed to
take actions within its power to prevent or repress the criminal acts of the
militias. 230 Assuming knowledge of the crimes allegedly perpetrated against

224. See Simons et al., supra n. 122, (quoting ICC Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo: '"[President alBashir's] motives were largely political,' the prosecutor said. 'His alibi was a "counterinsurgency." His
intent was genocide."').
225. See ICID Report, supra note 12, ~ 117 (distancing government from outlaw Janjaweed
groups).
226. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, at Art. 25(3)(d).
227. See id.
228. See id.; See also ANTONIO CASSESSE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 187-188(0xford
University Press 2003) (s 9.4.2: Participation Entailing Responsibility for the Foreseeable Crimes of
Other Participants).
229. Prosecutor v. Omar Hasan al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09 OA, Prosecution Document in Support of Appeal against the "Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against
Omar Hassan Ahmad AI Bashir" (July 6, 2009), ~ 17(a).
230. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, at Art. 28(b), superior responsibility not of a military nature
may be invoked where:
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the civilian population in Darfur, the Government of Sudan would either (1)
have failed to take actions to prevent or repress militia crimes or (2) lack
effective control over the militias in Darfur. 231 If the state failed to act to
protect its population, the question of the extent of the state's culpability
and of the state actors' culpability arises. 232 Thus, even if a state, through
its actors, is culpable in failing to act to prevent harms, such a failure does
not preclude an argument that the state effectively lacked sufficient power
to actually prevent crimes. 233

c. The Failed or Weakened State: Lack of Control over Militias
Lack of control over the militias where the state lacks authority might
previously have led to a determination that the acts of the militia could not
be attributable to the state. 234 However, the Responsibility to Protect
Resolution reintroduces the superior responsibility of government actors.
The international community promises to act through the Security
Council and in accordance with the Charter, including Security Council
coercion to maintain international peace and security, "should peaceful
means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity." 235 Such a failure to protect may be intentional or
may relate to a lack of control over those committing the crimes enumerated
in the Responsibility to Protect Resolution. 236 In either case, the Security
Council's responsive action requires a determination of failure to protect
(i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated,
that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes [within the mandate of
the ICC];
(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and control
of the superior; and
(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power
to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution.
231. Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 2007 I.C.J. 91, ~ 4 (Feb. 26).
232. !d. ~.460. (In a slightly different context, the JCJ noted in the Bosnia v. Serbia case that it
must determine "what were the consequences of the failure of [Serbia] to comply with its obligations
under the Genocide Convention to prevent and punish the crime of genocide, committed in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and what damage can be said to have been caused thereby.").
233. !d., ~ 462 ("The question is whether there is a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus
between the wrongful act, [Serbia]'s breach of the obligation to prevent genocide, and the injury suffered
by [Bosnia and Herzegovina], consisting of all damage of any type, material or moral, caused by the acts
of genocide. Such a nexus could be considered established only if the Court were able to conclude from
the case as a whole and with a sufficient degree of certainty that the genocide at Srebrenica would in fact
have been averted if [Serbia] had acted in compliance with its legal obligations. However, the Court
clearly cannot do so.").
234. See JCISS Report, supra note 131, viii.
235. 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 16, ~ 139.
236. See generally ICISS Report, supra note 131.
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from ongoing crimes subject to the mandate of the ICC, suggesting that the
state actor must know of or consciously disregard information concerning
crimes committed in the state's territory. 237 Again, the Responsibility to
Protect Resolution recognizes that "(e]ach individual State has the
responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate
and necessary means. " 238 Therefore, the crimes would have concerned
activities that were within the effective responsibility and, in the first
instance, at least presumptive control of the state. 239 It is only in the
responsibility to prevent crimes "through appropriate and necessary
means" 240 that a state's failure diverges from a prima facie case of superior
responsibility for that failure: under the Rome Statute, superior
responsibility is incurred if the superior "failed to take all necessary and
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution. "241 . It is at the point of convergence of a
failure in the power or will of the state actor to take all necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent or suppress the commission of these
international crimes-genocide, crimes against humanity (including ethnic
cleansing), and war crimes-that the international community acts as an
additional authority in the investigation, amelioration, and prosecution of
the crimes through referral by the Security Council to the ICC 242 •
Although a lack of power to prevent genocide, crimes against humanity,
or war crimes would allow for international intervention, this same lack of
power would not create criminal responsibility for those crimes. 243 If the
state is provided with additional power to prevent or suppress the
commission of crimes or is provided with means to submit the matter to
competent authorities but fails to do so, state actors, collectively or in their
individual capacities, incur criminal responsibility for the reasonably
foreseeable consequences of their actions. 244
237. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, at Art. 28(b)(l).
238. 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 16, ~ 138.
239. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, at Art. 28(b)(2).
240. 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 16, ~ 138.
241. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, at Art. 28(b)(3) (emphasis added).
242. See id. at Art. 13(b).
243. See id. at Art. 28(b), 25.
244. See id. at Arts. 28(b) and 25. See also Prosecutor v. Tadii: (Appeals), Case No. IT-94-1-A ~
220 (July 15, 1999) (accomplice liability for "concentration camp" cases, where knowledge of the
nature of a system of ill-treatment and an intent to further that common design of ill-treatment evidences
mens rea for crimes against humanity); /d. atn.351 (collecting cases of German Supreme Court for the
British Zone on culpability by German State actors Gudges, service members), based in turning other
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By failing to allow for international troops to enter, and stating that their
point of entry would become a graveyard based on the reaction of Sudanese
245
forces,
the Government of Sudan aided the continued actions of the
Janjaweed militias that would otherwise be prevented through the
application of customary international law-here, the Responsibility to
Protect. To the extent the Government of Sudan's prevention enables or
facilitates further crimes against humanity by the Janjaweed militias, the
responsible government authorities would be liable for complicity. 246 As
noted earlier, this is so even when the general approval of the acts would
typically not be included as a state action. 247
CONCLUSION

The Security Council recalled in agreeing to send troops to Sudan the
exercise of its power under the Responsibility to Protect Resolution. 248 The
exercise of that responsibility may require the Government of Sudan
consider the interplay between the various Chapter VII powers that the
Security Council utilizes.
Threats of harm to peacekeepers may allow for continued harm to
civilian populations for some time-but only after the Security Council has
recognized and publicized the harm Sudan has allowed against its
population in Darfur. The government authorities in Sudan cannot deny
their knowledge of the alleged crimes against humanity reported by the
ICID, nor the attempts made by the international community to assist in
preventing harm through the Security Council, pursuant to the
The humanitarian intervention
Responsibility to Protect resolution.
proffered by the Security Council attempts to follow a best practice in
preventing unilateral interventions, and the Secretary-General gave many
assurances that the force would assist the Government of Sudan in
preventing further harms.
individuals to the "uncontrollable power structure of the [Nazi] party and state," such that the victim is
"likely to be caught in an arbitrary and violent system.").
245. Anne Penketh, Sudan blocks UN troops in fear Darfor could become 'graMar.
II,
2006,
at
27.
available
at
veyard, 1NDEPENDENT,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africalsudan-blocks-un-troops-in-fear-darfur-could-becomegraveyard-469396.htrnl.
246. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, at Art. 25(3)(d)(ii).
247. Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the
Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal, '1)63 (Oct. 9, 2002). (Acknowledgement of approval as opposed
to adoption of the acts, "as a general matter ... will not be attributable to a State under [ILC Draft articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts] article II where a State merely acknowledges the factual existence of conduct or expresses its verbal approval of it.").
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The failure to allow for intervention may create state actor liability for
government support of militias and complicity in any crimes against
humanity those militias cause. The prosecution for complicity does not
create new law, but builds on the international support for the enforcement
of a Responsibility to Protect as well as other prosecutions for crimes
against humanity following the Second World War. In investigating the
situation in Darfur, Sudan, and prosecuting perpetrators of genocide, crimes
against humanity, or war crimes, the ICC may focus on a limited number of
individuals; however, should the ICC successfully prosecute government
actors on the basis of manifestly failing to protect their civilian populations,
leaders will respond more quickly to international concerns and the
concerns of their least protected populations.

